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108 E3D 42 (4TH CIR. 1997).
FACTS:
G.VV Rao, a county employee in the state of Virginia,
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit following the dismissal of his Title VII dis-
crimination claim in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.' His employment had been
terminated by appellee, the County of Fairfax. 2 In
response, Mr. Rao chose to pursue a discrimination claim
in the Fairfax office of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 3 He thereafter settled
with the county and continued employment but soon
made another discrimination claim against the county in
the Fairfax office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
4
In 1991, after a full hearing, the CSC ruled that the coun-
ty had not discriminated against Mr. Rao.' In 1993, he
once again filed discrimination charges against the coun-
ty with the EEOC, which subsequently ruled in his favor.
6
Nonetheless, the county refused conciliation and even-
tually terminated his employment in 1994.2 As a result,
Mr. Rao filed yet another charge of national origin dis-
crimination and retaliation with the EEOC in 1995.8 The
EEOC issued a right to sue letter, and Mr. Rao brought an
action in the Eastern District of Virginia.9 The district
court entered summary judgment against him, reasoning
that the state CSC's earlier determination of non-dis-
crimination had a preclusive effect on the Title VII dis-
crimination claim in federal court."°
HOLDING:
The Fourth Circuit unanimously held that an unre-
viewed state agency determination was not entitled to
preclusive effect in a Title VII case.I Therefore, the CSC's
dismissal of Mr. Rao's discrimination claims did not pre-
clude him from bringing the same claims in federal
court.The CSC's findings and conclusions lacked preclu-
sive effect in federal court even though under Virginia
law the CSC's determinations would have preclusive
effect inVirginia state courts."The appellate court found
that although the unreviewed agency determination
'G.VVRao v. County of Fairfax Va., 108 E3d 42, 43 (4th
Cir. 1997).









might be accorded "substantial weight," it was not intend-
ed by Congress to have preclusive effect. 13 However,
agency determinations reviewed by a state court, as
opposed to an agency, would have a preclusive effect on
Title VII actions in federal courts.The full faith and cred-
it clause of the Constitution, as included in 28 U.S.C. §
1738, operates on the state court judgments to estop
later federal claims. 14 In reaching its conclusions, the
Fourth Circuit relied heavily on earlier Supreme Court
decisions elucidating virtually identical principles of
preclusion."1
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION:
The Fourth Circuit began by reviewing 28 U.S.C. §
1738, which applies the principles of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution to the
federal courts.The specific section relied on by the court
provides that "the records and judicial proceedings of
any court of any ... state ... shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States ... as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ...
from which they are taken."' 6 Put another way, state
court findings and conclusions have preclusive effect in
federal courts.The Fourth Circuit then relied on Allen v.
McCurry, a case in which the Supreme Court held that
federal courts must give state court judgments preclu-
sive effect when the state from which the judgment
came would do so." The importance of the Allen deci-
sion and section 1738 lies in the fact that they deal with
the preclusive effect of court judgments, and by implica-
tion withhold preclusive effect from agency judgments.
The Fourth Circuit grounded its opinion in that essential
difference. In a footnote the Fourth Circuit stated that
the CSC is not a court, because county grievance panels
are defined separately from courts in the Virginia Code."
The Fourth Circuit's decision was heavily influenced
by two earlier Supreme Court decisions with similar fact
patterns. In Kremer v. Cbemical Construction Corpora-
tion, 456 U.S. 461 (1982), petitioner appealed a decision
of the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit determined
"Id. at 45.
'W1d. at 43 n.1.
"3Id. at 45, quoting University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S.
788,795 (1986), quoting, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(b).
4Id.
'51d. See, Kremer v. Chemical Constr Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
470 n.7 (1982),and University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,
795 (1986).
16Id. quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738, (emphasis added).
7Id., quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
"'Id. at 45-46 n.3.
that petitioner's federal Title VII claim was precluded by
a NewYork state court's review of an earlier state agency
determination of non-discrimination.The Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit, holding that Section 1783
does indeed apply to Title VII claims, and therefore state
agency decisions reviewed by state courts have preclu-
sive effect on claims brought in federal courts. 19 The
Court stated that the opposite would hold true if the
state agency determination had not been reviewed by a
state court, even if state law would hold otherwise. 0 In a
footnote, the Kremer Court stated that "since it is settled
that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial de
novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed admin-
istrative determinations by state agencies also should not
preclude such review even if such a decision were to be
afforded preclusive effect in a State's own courts."2
In the second case relied on by the Fourth Circuit in
Rao, University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788
(1986), the Court solidified its stance with regard to the
preclusive effect of agency decisions. In Elliott, a univer-
sity employee was found not to have been discriminated
against after a full state agency hearing similar to the CSC
hearing given to Mr. Rao.22 Prior to the hearing, the
employee filed a Title VII claim in the District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee.2 3 The district court
held that the employee's federal court claim was pre-
cluded by the administrative law judge's dismissal at the
state agency level.2 4 Relying on Kremer, the Sixth Circuit
reversed. 5 It held that the employee was entitled to a
trial de novo even if state law would give preclusive
effect to the agency determination. 6 The court found the
doctrine of res judicata (preclusion) inapplicable to state
agency determinations when claimants later brought
Title VII claims in federal court.27 The appellate court
then proceeded to extend this nonpreclusion doctrine
to other Reconstruction civil rights statutes, including
section 1983.8 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth
Circuit's determination that unreviewed state agency
action does not preclude federal Title VII claims, but
reversed the Sixth Circuit's application of this doctrine
to Reconstruction civil rights statutes because common
law rules of preclusion still applied to those statutes.2 9
The Court found that nothing in the Reconstruction
'Kremer v. Chemical Constr Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467
(1982).
'Kremer, 456 U.S at 469.
2 Id. at 470 n.7.
2 University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,791 (1986).






statutes hinted at a congressional desire for the common
law rules of preclusion to lose their effect." In contrast,
Congress expressly stated in Title VII that federal courts
should give "substantial weight" to agency determina-
tions in discrimination cases.3 ' The Court reasoned that
this language would be superfluous if Congress did not
intend for those state agency determinations ever to be
reviewed by federal courts at all.32Therefore, the Court in
Elliott found that federal courts could review unre-
viewed state agency decisions in Title VII actions.33
The Fourth Circuit in Rao concluded its analysis by
reviewing the uniform acceptance of Elliott by the other
circuit courts and by stating "that despite the 'adjudicato-
ry' nature of the CSC hearing, the October 1991 decision
remains, at bottom, an unreviewed state administrative
determination which is not entitled to any preclusive
effect in a Title VII case."" Under the circumstances, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the granting of summary judgment
in favor of the County of Fairfax and remanded the case
to the district court for a determination on the merits."
CONCLUSION:
In Rao, the Fourth Circuit held that an unreviewed
state agency determination does not preclude a Title VII
action in federal court.36This broad holding contains few
restraints.The individual who claims discrimination must
bring a Title VII action in the federal court and he or she
must not have had an earlier discrimination case in a
state court.31 Any state court determination based on the
same episode of discrimination will preclude the federal
Title VII action on full faith and credit grounds. 38 The
court implied by reference to previous cases that a dis-
crimination action brought under a different civil rights
statute will also be precluded by rules of common law
preclusion.
39
The effect of this holding can be stated quite simply.
Any party wishing to bring a Title VII claim should file a
claim of discrimination at the state agency level. The
party should pursue that claim through full administra-
tive channels, including a full hearing. If unsuccessful, the
claimant may then bring an action in state court-if
review is provided for by statute-or in federal court.
"Id. at 796-797.
"Id. at 797.
3'Id. at 795, quoting, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b).
321d.
31d. at 796.







However, the party must remain cognizant of the fact
that final agency action will only be reviewed by federal
courts if the claim falls under Title VII and if no review
on the claim has been completed by a state court.
Otherwise, preclusion principles will bar the claim.This
holding merely gives a discrimination claimant, in certain
instances, a choice between state and federal forums fol-
lowing adverse agency determination.
The Fourth Circuit leaves one essential question
unanswered by its decision in Rao. Is there any minimum
level of review necessary in the state court in order to
trigger preclusion in federal courts? Put another way,
would state court review of a minor procedural issue in
a particular discrimination claim preclude de novo
review on the merits in federal court? Although I think
that federal review would still be possible, the opinion in
Rao does not give a clear answer to this question.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
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